In 2013 China produced 3.19 million tons of pesticide, continuing the impressive growth the industry has witnessed over the last five years. Import volumes have also grown over the past 5 years, which have diluted profit margins for domestic interests and greatly increased competition. (See ChemLinked News Release on 13 May 2014. Domestic interests can take some solace in the fact that the increase in exportation has heavily outweighed importation. In the early 21th century, China mainly exported glyphosate and paraquat to the overseas market, but China become the major exporter of new generics and out of some profitable generic active ingredient, which includes azoxystrobin, kresoxim-methyl, mesotrione and glufosinate, etc. Driven by favorable exportation importation ratios, the industry has seen growth and significant increase in both revenue and investment. Major Economic indicator of Chinese Pesticide Industry in FY2013 Category Assets(billion CNY) Change (%) Income(billion CNY) Change (%) Profit(billion CNY) Change (%) Chemical Pesticide 176.22 17.3 252.24 18.7 20.74 32.8 Biopesticide 15.22 12.6 28.72 22.3 20.74 13.7 Total 191.44 16.9 281.26 19.1 22.92 30.8 Fixed Asset Investment in FY2013 Category Planned (billion CNY) Change (%) Achieved (billion CNY) Change (%) Number of Projects Change (%) Chemical Pesticide

In June 2014 the price of Chinese produced glyphosate was CNY 30,000 per ton which represented a significant decrease from April’s values which were on average 36,000 and was a mere shadow of the heights witnessed during 2013’s glyphosate rush. It would be reasonable to point the finger at poor overseas sales performances. However upon closer scrutiny China MEP’s failure to stabilize production volume is probably the telling factor and requires both China’s government and domestic industry to profoundly rethink China’s domestic development strategy. China’s government has been almost powerless in reigning in the massive fluctuations in the value of Chinese produced glyphosate and has laid the foundations for massive regulatory reform with the hope of changing this situation.    Global Demand and Policy Failures: The relationship between South American demand and Chinese glyphosate prices was highlighted by a sharp decline in consumption and the inevitable negative impact on glyphosate prices. In response to declining sales, China’s knee jerk reaction has been to attempt to decrease overall supply in the hope of stabilizing price. The Chinese glyphosate industry and the price of Chinese glyphosate exports have been victims of China’s high volume/low quality production paradigm. A dispersed production base divided into the hands of hundreds of small production operations has made price fixing almost impossible. Stabilizing Value Means Controlling the Supply The government’s solution to this problem is to centralize production and ultimately control supply variables, a natural selection by regulation designed to thin China’s glyphosate production herd allowing only the fittest producers to survive. The supposition is that increased regulatory standards and greater regulation of production certification will force substandard glyphosate exporters out of business and thereby consolidat

The effect of environmental protection inspection on China Glyphosate industry, EPI progress, the next work plan of CCPIA on Glyphosate manufacturers and how EPI effect on the price of Glyphosate etc. are all discussed in this article. The author is came from CCPIA, one half government organization organized and directing the Glyphosate EPI. 

This article details the regulatory requirements and mandatory procedures for import and export of pesticides in China and the management of the two special pesticide types a) pesticide for export only and b) substances falling outside the regulatory definition of pesticides but used in pesticide applications commonly known as “non-pesticide use pesticide (NPUP)”

This article has summarized the banned or restricted for use pesticide in china which are  published by MOA announcements and those pesticides which are suggested to be banned or restricted for use by the pesticide registration review committee. Also it describe  the followed control  measures and suggestion  for administration of  highly hazardous pesticide in china .

e we provide an explanation delivered by Mr. Zong Fulin, Division Director of the newly formed office in which he explains the rationale for the establiIn March 2013, ICAMA (Institute for the Control of Agrochemicals, Ministry of Agricultural) established a new division called the Pesticide Registration Review Office. The newly formed office has been tasked with reassessing registered pesticide products currently circulating in the marketplace. In this articlshment of this office and the necessity for reassessment of registered pesticides. China implemented pesticide registration in 1982, however since implementation post market supervision of registered products has been grossly inadequate and poorly equipped to guarantee the safe use of pesticides and minimize the negative environmental and social impact associated with their use. Indeed in the past the only major regulatory hurdle for pesticide products has been the renewal of pesticide registration. In reality this checkpoint has been little more than a formality with successful renewal usually a foregone conclusion. Indeed the only real impetus for revoking registration has been when serious adverse effects or events force the governments to institute a regulatory ban, comparable to closing the stable door after the horse has bolted. Regulation and enforcement within this industry has ranged from inefficient to corrupt to extremely criminal. The industry has been plagued by practices such as the sale of “registration status" and the indefinite extension of registration both of which have continued to hamper implementation of effective and safe regulations. From a purely economic standpoint, not mentioning the social and ethical issues, the consequences of this archaic system has negatively affected the development of the Chinese pesticide industry since its inception. The system has severely hampered domestic R&D and resulted in an industry flooded by inferior quality “me-too” (gene

China’s Regulations on Pesticide Administration (Decree 326 of the State Council) was promulgated and enacted on 29 November 2001. It is the overarching legislation for the pesticide sector, aiming to control the production, registration, marketing and use of pesticides. On 20 July 2011, a draft proposal to amend the regulation was released for public consultation. Late last year, officials from the Institute for the Control of Agrochemicals (ICAMA), which is part of the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), made numerous announcements on the impending promulgation of the final version (see Chemlinked News Released on Nov 16 2012). However, after being all but approved by the standing committee of the State Council, barring a signature from the council chairman, the legislative process has come to an abrupt halt. According to MoA’s working programme, which was released in April 2013, the regulation may fall at the last legislative hurdle. This is perhaps unsurprising, given recent leadership changes and the need for consensus across a number of different authorities. Cross-ministry management It is necessary to register all pesticides with the MoA prior to placing them on the market. The agricultural department under the State Council is responsible for the registration, supervision and control of pesticides throughout the country. Registration of new pesticides, when they are first produced or imported, consists of field trials, then temporary registration and finally full registration. ICAMA is responsible for reviewing the dossiers, then collecting technical suggestions and a decision from the National Committee of Pesticide Registration. If the registration process is successful, the MoA will issue a registration certificate of Pesticide Registration, known as ICAMA Registration. In addition to pesticide registration, enterprises producing, formulating or repacking pesticides within the territory of China must obtain manufacturing approval from the Mi

The current inflationary trend in glyphosate prices is reminiscent of 2008 when the price surged to over 100,000 Yuan per ton. This previous “glyphosate bubble” hallmarked by a huge price increase and subsequent crash is tempering investors and speculators enthusiasm with understandable caution. After bottoming out at a low of 19,000 Yuan per ton, glyphosate’s value has seen steady and dependable appreciation. At first glance this inflation can be attributed to simple fluctuations in the cost of raw materials and newly enacted government regulations in China. However upon closer scrutiny and detailed analysis we see that the recent price rise has been preceded by fierce political maneuverings, trade disputes and to a large extent the calculated business savvy demonstrated by Monsanto. Glyphosate production is an integral cog in the economic engine of China’s crop protection manufacturing base. The amount of associated industry upstream and downstream both foreign and international involved in its productions, distribution transport etc. cannot be understated and for this reason the Chinese government is understandably protective of its interest. Treading a dangerous line between outright anticompetitive behaviors and protecting its indigenous markets, the Chinese government has adjusted the export tax rebate on N-Phosphonomethyl Aminodiacetic Acid (PMIDA) (an important precursor chemical of glyphosate). The removal of the 13% rebate was pitched as an environmental initiative to protect China’s phosphorus resources. However an ulterior motive for this move which has a hugely significant (and surely intended) knock-on effect is the promotion of the indigenous Chinese glyphosate industry. Foreign manufacturers sourcing PMIDA from China are now at a sizeable disadvantage in comparison to their Chinese counterparts. The move has been welcomed by the Chinese glyphosate industry and seems to have had the desired effect with indigenous enterpr

The GB 2763-2012, which was issued under the joint Announcement 22 of MOA and MOH, has come into force on Mar 1 2013. As the latest compulsory standard, it contains 2293 limits for 322 active ingredients on 10 categories of food commodities, and can also be considered as a replacement of some previous national standards and industrial standards of pesticide MRLs. Overview of the 2293 MRLs The GB 2763-2012 set 2253 MRLs for plant-derived food and 40 for animal-derived food, constituting around 98.2% and 1.87% respectively. Vegetables will be subject to the most MRLs, followed by fruits, cereals and cereal products, oil plants and oil products, sugar crops, beverages and edible fungus (see Table 1). Table 1: Distribution of MRLs in different food categories GB 2763-2012 vs GB 2763-2005 Compared with the 2005 version, GB2763-2012 has a number of improvements: 1.More explicit in scope, terms and definitions. The 2005 version provided a precondition that “when producing food or protecting food commodities from pests, the pesticide should be utilized according to the rules of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP)”, which left the loopholes of MRL violations on some food commodities as the poor enforcement of GAP in China. The removal of this precondition has broadened the range of acceptable MRLs. Furthermore, other definitions in 2005 versions which included the “acute reference dose”, “provisional-acceptable daily intake”, and “provisional tolerable daily intake” have been removed as well. An important revision is that the English name/definition of the residue, the “pesticide residue” has been amended as is now reffered to as the “residue definition” (hereafter refer to the “pesticide residue” as “residue definition”). To better explain the MRLs applicable in different crops and food commodities, GB 2763-2012 specified the crop/food ranges in its Informative Annex